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The Comparative Negligence Defense in
Pennsylvania Dram Shop Suits: Personal
Responsibility for All Patrons
I. Introduction
Pennsylvania has not traditionally recognized the defense of
contributory negligence in dram shop suits. Taverns which serve a
patron in violation of the Liquor Code' and are sued for subsequent
injuries to the patron or a third party cannot have their liability
apportioned, despite the negligent acts of the patron. Generally, if a
plaintiff establishes that a tavern violated the Liquor Code, the tavern is
deemed negligent per se and is held fully liable for any alcohol-related
injuries.
With regard to minor-patrons, however, an exception has been
carved out which allows the defense of comparative negligence to be
raised in some instances to apportion fault between the tavern and the
minor patron. When a tavern violates the Liquor Code by serving a
minor, the tavern is deemed negligent per se and is liable for injuries
sustained by the minor's consumption.2 The tavern may, however,
assert the negligence of the minor as a defense and liability may be
reduced accordingly.3 Serving a visibly intoxicated customer, also a
violation of the Liquor Code, is also deemed to be negligence per se,4
but the defense of comparative negligence is not available in this case.,
This Comment will trace the development of licensee civil liability
and the availability of the comparative negligence defense to licensees in
Pennsylvania. Furthermore, this Comment will demonstrate that the
defense of comparative negligence should be available to taverns whose
negligence per se derives from the service of alcohol to visibly
intoxicated customers. Judicial integrity and social policy necessitate this
change. Comparative negligence equitably apportions responsibility and
fault between culpable parties. By denying taverns this defense, they
suffer a disproportionate degree of liability in dram shop suits.' The
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 8-803 (1969 & Supp. 1993).
2. See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
6. Comparative negligence was adopted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1976. Act
of July 9, 1976, No. 152, 1976 Pa. Laws 855 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1993). For the text of this act and a discussion of the relevance of this
change from contributory to comparative negligence see infra notes 67, 78.
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Pennsylvania courts perceived the wisdom and fairness in allowing
taverns the defense of comparative negligence in suits involving the
service of alcohol to minors. Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts should
extend this logic and allow taverns to use the defense of comparative
negligence for suits involving the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated
adults.
II. Historical Background
A. The Finding Of Civil Liability
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Liquor Code, or Dram
Shop Act, in 1951.' The Liquor Code regulates and licenses the
distribution of intoxicating liquors by commercial vendors.' It also
establishes criminal liability and provides criminal penalties for its
violation.9 Criminal liability stems from service of alcohol to certain
groups of individuals. In section 4-493 the act specifies five groups to
whom the sale of intoxicants is unlawful. Among these are minors and
visibly intoxicated customers. 0
In Pennsylvania a violation of the Liquor Code can give rise to
civil" as well as criminal liability.' 2 The courts have determined that
a violation of the Liquor Code is negligence per se. 13 Injured plaintiffs
need only prove that the licensee violated the act and that as a result of
this violation, they were injured.
14
7. Act of April 12, 1951, No. 21, 1951-52 Pa. Laws 90 (codified as amended at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 8-803 (1969 and Supp. 1993).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-401 to 4-499 (1969 & Supp. 1993).
9. These include fines, imprisonment and suspension or revocation of a liquor license. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-494.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Supp. 1993), states in pertinent part:
(1) For any licensee or the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee
or of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed
beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished or
given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to
habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.
(emphasis supplied).
11. This finding of civil liability was a departure from the traditional common law view where
it was not a tort to provide liquor to "able bodied" persons. Traditionally, it was thought that the
consumption of alcohol was the cause of any subsequent injury. See Herr v. Booten, 580 A.2d
1115, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 428, at 133-36 (1981); 45
AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553, at 852-53 (1969).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-494 (Supp. 1993).
13. For a discussion on negligence per se see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 36, at 227 (5th. ed. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Evans, 219 A.2d 310, 311 (Pa. 1966); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205
A.2d 873, 875-76 (Pa. 1965); Smith v. Clark, 190 A.2d 441, 442 (Pa. 1963) (violation of § 4-
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Examples of Pennsylvania courts finding taverns liable for violations
of the Liquor Code include Majors v. Brodhead Hotel 5 and Smith v.
Evans.'6 In Majors, a man became "exceedingly" drunk at a party in
a hotel.' 7 In an attempt to keep him from causing problems with the
other guests, hotel staff placed him in the bathroom.'" The man then
crawled out of the bathroom window and proceeded to walk around on
the roof. The man fell off the roof and sustained injuries. 9 He then
sued the hotel under the theory of negligence per se. The complaint
alleged that the hotel had violated section 4-493(1) of the Liquor Code
by serving a visibly intoxicated person.' The trial court found the
hotel liable and the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.2 The court
recounted that serving a person who is visibly intoxicated is negligence
per se. In the event that the violation is a proximate cause of the injury
to the intoxicated person, or another, the licensee is liable. 2
In Evans, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a
commercial licensee could be held liable for damages proximately caused
by serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated minor in violation of the
Liquor Code. 3  The court stated that in serving such a person, the
tavern violated the law. If the intoxication was a proximate cause of the
resultant injuries, then the tavern is liable in tort.'
493(1) by service of alcohol to an intoxicated minor constituted two separate violations, both
constituting negligence per se); Peluso v. Walter, 483 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (the service
of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated customer is negligence per se, bringing absolute liability to the
tavern for injuries proximately resulting and the testimony of the tavern owner stating that the
customer was not visibly intoxicated at the time of sale is not enough to support the tavern owner's
motion for summary judgment); Couts v. Ghion, 421 A.2d. 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (licensed
restaurant could be held liable for injuries sustained by third party proximately resulting from the
unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated patron); Connelly v. Ziegler, 380 A.2d
902 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (the service of intoxicants to a visibly intoxicated patron is a violation of
§ 4-493(l) and therefore constitutes negligence per se, and a licensee is liable for the death of a
patron who fell down stairs as a result of the intoxication); Stewart v. Sutliff, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 613
(1989) (in applying Connelly, 380 A.2d 902, and Evans, 219 A.2d 310, the court stated that a tavern
keeper is liable in tort for violating the law by serving someone who is visibly intoxicated if as a
result of the intoxication the consumer injures themself or someone else. This duty is limited to the
person that is served the alcohol and anyone whom that person may injure. This duty did not extend
to the motorist who struck the walking intoxicated patron.).
15. 205A.2d 873 (Pa. 1965).
16. 219A.2d 310 (Pa. 1966).




21. Majors, 205 A.2d at 878.
22. Id. at 875-76.
23. Evans, 219 A.2d at 311.
24. Id. The court went on to state that the fact that the patron was a minor was not enough
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Violation of the Liquor Code has, then, been deemed to give rise to
civil liability. This liability is absolute in that a licensee who is found to
have violated the Liquor Code will be found liable upon a showing of
causation. Along with a finding of absolute liability, the courts have
denied taverns the defense of contributory negligence.
B. Contributory Negligence Implications
Relying on section 483 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
Majors court denied Brodhead Hotel the opportunity to assert the defense
of contributory negligence. 5 The defendant hotel argued that the trial
court should have instructed the jury on the theory of contributory
negligence.26 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the
defendant and held that the lower court did not err in refusing this
instruction.27 The Supreme Court followed an earlier Superior Court
decision in Schelin v. Goldberg' and applied the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 483.29 Section 483 states that statutes enacted to
protect a specific class of persons from their inability to exercise self-
protective care are to be treated differently in regard to available
defenses to the defendant.30 When one of these "exceptional statutes"
to establish liability. Id. Because of the passage of section 4-497, proof of intoxication at the time
of sale was required to find civil liability. Id. For discussion on licensee's liability for service to
minor's see infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
25. Majors, 205 A.2d at 876. For the text and discussion of the court's application of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965), see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying
text.
26. Majors, 205 A.2d at 876.
27. Id.
28. 146 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958). In Schelin, the court held that section 483 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts should apply in Liquor Code suits. The defendant in Majors
attempted to distinguish the two cases by the fact that in Schelin the patron had arrived at the
defendant's bar already intoxicated while in Majors the Plaintiff became intoxicated while at the
hotel. Majors, 205 A.2d at 876. The court dismissed this as a distinction without a difference. Id.
29. Section 483, Defense to Violation of Statute, states:
The plaintiffs contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the
defendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place
the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965).
30. Thus, the court implicitly applied comment c. to section 483 which provides in pertinent
part:
There are, however, exceptional statutes which are intended to place the entire
responsibility for the harm which has occurred upon the defendant. A statute may be
found to have that purpose particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain
class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves. Thus a statute which
prohibits the sale of firearms to minors may be clearly intended, among other purposes,
to protect them against their own inexperience, lack of judgment, and tendency toward
negligence, and to make the seller solely responsible for any harm to them resulting from
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is implemented in a civil suit, a member of the special class is not barred
from recovery by their contributory negligence.31 The court determined
that the legislature enacted section 4-493(1) to protect people when they
are visibly intoxicated.32 Since the plaintiff, Majors, was visibly
intoxicated when the hotel served him, the hotel was liable for the
injuries plaintiff received as a proximate result of his intoxication.33
Recently, a Pennsylvania trial court followed Majors and Schelin
and ruled that the defense of contributory negligence is unavailable to
licensees sued under the theory of negligence per se. In Neal v. Sunset
Grove, Inc. ,34 the court sustained the plaintiff's preliminary objections
to the defendant's use of the contributory negligence35 defense.36
Relying on the holdings in Majors and Schelin, the court concluded that
the plaintiff was not barred from recovery for injuries sustained as a
result of the defendant's violation of the Liquor Code. The plaintiffs
own negligence was deemed irrelevant.37
Taverns in violation of the Liquor Code have been deemed to be
strictly liable to persons injured. They were prevented from asserting the
negligence of the patron to whom they served alcohol in violation of the
Liquor Code. These rules changed in regard to minors, however, when
the liability for service to minors in violation of the Liquor Code
changed.
the sale. In such a case the purpose of the statute would be defeated if the contributory
negligence of the minor were permitted to bar his [or her] recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965) (emphasis supplied).
31. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965). See also Majors, 205 A.2d at 876.
32. Majors, 205 A.2d at 876. For discussion of the appropriateness of the court's placing
intoxicated people into the class of people the legislature intended to be protected from themselves
by § 4-493(1), see infra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
33. Majors, 205 A.2d at 877-78.
34. 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 294 (1988). In Neal, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the
defendant's employee served the plaintiff while he was visibly intoxicated and that the plaintiff was
involved in a serious accident as a result of his intoxication. Id. at 295.
35. The Neal court used the term contributory negligence but the case was commenced well
after the adoption of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania in 1976. Other cases have applied
comparative negligence and used the term contributory negligence. See, e.g., Congini by Congini
v. Porterville Valve Co. 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983). For a discussion on the distinction between
contributory negligence and comparative negligence see infra notes 67 and 78. For this distinction's
relevance to this Comment see infra notes 110-140 and accompanying text.
36. Neal, I Pa. D. & C.4th at 296-97. Under its new matter, the defendant also raised the
defense of assumption of the risk. Id. at 297. The court sustained plaintiffs preliminary objection
to this defense also, stating that a violation of section 4-493(1) is negligence per se, making
defendant liable for injuries proximately caused by the violation. Id. at 297-99 (citing Connelly v.
Ziegler, 380 A.2d 902 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)). The court also applied the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 496F which is considered to be analogous to section 483 regarding contributory
negligence. Id. at 298.
37. Id. at 296.
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C. The Change For Service To Minors
Licensee civil liability for the service of alcohol to minors changed
in 1965,38 when the Pennsylvania legislature added section 4-49739 to
the Liquor Code.' Section 4-497 provides that no licensee shall be
liable to a third person4' for damages sustained by a patron unless said
patron was visibly intoxicated at the time of the sale.42 The addition of
section 4-497 seemed to indicate that a tavern could not be held liable for
serving alcohol to an unintoxicated minor. 3 Under the statute, a tavern
could be held liable only for serving a visibly intoxicated person.
44
In Matthews v. Konieczny45 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went
beyond the rule set forth in the statute and held that as a matter of
common law commercial licensees can be held liable for serving an
unintoxicated minor.' The Matthews court was presented with two
38. Jane Leopold-Leventhal, Pennsylvania Broadens Commercial Licensee Liquor Liability for
the Service of Alcoholic Beverages to Minors--Matthews v. Konieczny, 61 TEMP. LAW REV. 643,
652 (1988).
39. Section 4-497 states:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted upon
them off the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless the customer who
inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or malt or brewed beverages by
the said licensee or his agent, servant or employee when the said customer was visibly
intoxicated.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Supp. 1993).
40. Statutes of this type have been characterized as "anti-dramshop" acts. These acts seek to
exempt vendors from civil liability except under narrow circumstances. Julius F. Lang, Jr. & John
J. McGrath, Comment, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road"
Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1130-34 (1983-84). This can be seen as
evidence of an interest in the legislature not to constrain business relations. Many times these
statutes are reactions to the acts which were passed in an attempt to deter drunk driving.
41. This section applies only to situations where a third party is injured by a customer of the
defendant. See Simon v. Shirley, 409 A.2d 1365, 1366 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (distinguishing
Connelly v. Ziegler, 380 A.2d 902 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), on grounds that plaintiff in Connelly was
a customer of the defendant licensee as opposed to a third party).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Supp. 1993).
43. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Supp. 1993) (which makes no mention of
minors), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Supp. 1993) (which includes minors).
44. Compare Smith v. Evans, 219 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1966) with Smith v. Clark, 190 A.2d 441
(Pa. 1963). In Clark, the court found negligence per se in the service of alcohol to a minor, while
in Evans (decided after the adoption of section 4-497) the court specifically stated that the service
of alcohol to a minor was not enough to establish liability. Evans, 219 A.2d at 311. The plaintiff
must prove that the purchaser was intoxicated at the time of purchase regardless of the patron's age.
See id. See also Shirley, 409 A.2d at 1366-67 (commercial vendor's service of alcohol to an
unintoxicated minor absolves the vender of liability for damages resulting from minor's subsequent
intoxication); Peluso v. Walter, 483 A.2d 905, 907 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Speicher v. Reda, 434
A.2d 183, 185-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
45. 527A.2d 508 (Pa. 1987).
46. Id. at 510. For an evaluation of this change and the court's reasoning see Leopold-
Leventhal supra note 38, at 649. The author argues that the finding of liability for a licensee who
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cases in which a licensee had served a minor.47 In neither case did the
complaint allege that the minor was visibly intoxicated at the time they
purchased the beer. In both cases the lower court had granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the Superior Court had
affirmed.'
The Supreme Court in Matthews overturned the lower courts and
determined that a minor, as one who cannot legally purchase alcohol, is
not a "customer" within the meaning of section 4-497 of the Liquor
Code. 49 Therefore, a licensee is not absolved from liability under
section 4-497 of the Liquor Code for serving an unintoxicated minor.
The court stated that it was not the intent of the legislature to absolve
licensees from liability when they provide alcohol to a minor.5' The
violation of the licensee arises out of the Liquor Code and the Crimes
Code, 5 and the violating licensee is therefore negligent per se.52
has served an unintoxicated minor is incorrect. The author argues that the court goes against the
clear legislative intent of section 4-497 in expanding social host liability to commercial vendors.
According to the author, section 4-497 was enacted to absolve licensees from liability except in cases
where the licensee served a visibly intoxicated adult. Furthermore, the author asserts, the finding
of liability through the Crimes Code amounts to "manipulative statutory interpretation" and "judicial
activism" which violates the proper role of the courts. The author concludes that although there may
be social considerations which support the finding in Matthews, it is for the legislature and not the
judiciary to make decisions. Id.
An evaluation of the correctness of the decision in Matthews is beyond the scope of this
comment.
47. In one case a group of minors had pooled their money and one minor had purchased a case
of beer from the defendant. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 510. After driving around while consuming
the beer the youths were involved in an accident in which one of the minors died. This minor's
estate sued, among others, the beer distributor who had sold the beer. Id.
In the other case, a minor had purchased beer from a distributor. Id. A second minor had
consumed some of this beer and had been subsequently involved in an accident. Matthews, 527
A.2d at 510. The minor was found to be legally intoxicated at the scene of the accident. Id. The
plaintiff, who had been injured in the accident, sued several defendants including the distributor for
its sale of alcohol to a minor. Id.
48. Id. at 509-10.
49. Id. at 512-13.
50. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 513.
51. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (Supp. 1993). Section 6308(a) of the Crimes Code
states:
A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21 years of age,
attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or knowingly and intentionally
transports any liquor or malt or brewed beverages ....
Id. Liability on the part of the supplier is found through accomplice culpability in 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 306 (1983). Section 306 of the Crimes Code states in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.--A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own
conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
(b) Conduct of another.--A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another
person when:
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In Matthews, the Supreme Court relied upon its prior reasoning in
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.53 In Congini, a social host was found
negligent per se for serving a minor in violation of section 6308 of the
Crimes Code54 where the minor wrecked his car while driving home
from the company Christmas party. 55  The court found the defendant-
employer liable for the injuries proximately resulting from the minor's
intoxication. It was acknowledged by the court that it was departing
from established law for social hosts which found no liability for injuries
resulting from the service of intoxicants to guests.56
The court found that in enacting the Crimes Code the legislature
determined that persons under the age of twenty-one are incompetent to
handle alcohol. Therefore, a social host who serves a minor alcohol
breaches a statutory duty and is negligent per se. It was the legislative
intent that liability be imposed on anyone who serves a minor, where
such service results in injuries.57
(1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct;
(2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other-person by this title
or by the law defining the offense; or
(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
(c) Accomplice defined.--A person is an accomplice of another person in the
commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense,
he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it; or
(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
§ 306(a), (b) and (c).
52. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512 & n.4. The court notes that the intention of the General
Assembly in prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors is to protect both minors and the public at
large. Id. at 511.
53. 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983). The Matthews court also affirmed Congini's holding the same
day it decided Matthews. In Omer v. Mallick 527 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1987), the court held that serving
alcohol to any minor was a breach of duty. Matthews 527 A.2d at 510.
54. For the text of section 6308 see supra note 51.
55. Congini, 470 A.2d at 516.
56. Id. at 517. See supra note 11 for common law social host liability.
57. Id. at 517-18. This thinking has been expanded subsequently. See, e.g., Ornerv. Mallick,
527 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. 1987) (holding that a social host is negligent per se for serving "any"
alcohol to a minor, "not just an amount sufficient to intoxicate the minor."); Herr v. Booten, 580
A.2d 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (student for whom roommates purchased alcohol on day before
birthday was not considered twenty-one for purposes of section 6308 of the Crimes Code and
therefore roommates were negligent per se); McGaha v. Matter, 528 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(The Superior Court, in applying Matthews, ruled that the trial court erred in determining that the
plaintiff had no cause of action where complaint failed to aver that minor was visibly drunk when
he purchased alcohol.).
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In Matthews, the court determined that what is true for a social host
is also true for a licensee under the Liquor Code." Serving alcohol to
a minor constitutes a breach of duty whether it is done by a social host
or by a licensee. 9 According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
Crimes Code manifests a clear legislative intent to protect minors and the
general public from the detrimental effects of a minor's consumption of
alcohol.' The violation of the Crimes Code by a licensee is negligence
per se 6' and upon a finding that a minor was served intoxicating liquor,
the licensee involved is liable for injuries proximately caused by the
minor's intoxication. 62
Despite the passage of section 4-497 of the Liquor Code, negligence
per se is found where a licensee serves an unintoxicated minor.63 The
court reasoned around the statute 4 and with this reasoning the
traditional rule regarding contributory negligence also changed.
D. Comparative Negligence Implications
The court in Congini stated that a social host could assert the
minor's comparative negligence as a defense.6' The court stated that
a cause of action in tort exists for an injured minor or a third party
against a social host who violates the Crimes Code by serving the minor
intoxicants. The court also reasoned that a social host may assert a
minor's contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.' The court
went on to state that under Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligent Act,67
58. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 511 (citing Congini, 470 A.2d at 518).
61. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511; Congini, 470 A.2d at 518.
62. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511; Congini, 470 A.2d at 518. See also cases cited insupra note
57.
63. See supra note 46 for evaluation of this finding.
64. See supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
65. Congini, 470 A.2d at 518.
66. Id. "[Allthough we recognize that an eighteen year old minor may state a cause of action
against an adult social host who has knowingly served him intoxicants, the social host in turn may
assert as a defense the minor's 'contributory' negligence." Id.
67. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (1981). Section 7102 states in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.--In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal
representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the
defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by
the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.--Where recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the
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the fact finder must resolve whether the defendant's negligence was
sufficient to allow recovery.6"
Not surprisingly, the reasoning in Congini regarding social hosts
was adopted for commercial vendors as well. In Matthews, the Supreme
Court held that the liability found was not absolute or irrebuttable, but
that the defendant could attempt to establish the comparative negligence
of the actors involved.69
The court directly confronted the issue of comparative negligence
in Barrie v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.7° The Barrie court
affirmed the common pleas court's decision allowing the licensee to
assert the defense of the comparative negligence on the part of the minor
injured plaintiff.7 ' In Barrie, a mother sued several defendants who
were involved with her minor son's consumption of alcohol on the night
her son drowned. One defendant, the state liquor store, had sold alcohol
to the deceased's friend who was also a minor.' The trial court
applied comparative negligence principles and found in favor of all of the
defendants .
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court dismissed the plaintiff's
assertion that Majors and Schelin controlled.74 Rather, the court
maintained that the case was controlled by Matthews and Congini.5
The court attempted to distinguish Majors and Schelin by stating that
those decisions did not hold the licensee strictly liable, but were actually
drawing an inference that the illegal service was a substantial cause of
the injury.76  The court concluded that it would be a nearly
insurmountable burden for the plaintiff to have to prove which drink
caused the harm.77
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the cases of Majors and
Schelin, which had applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 483
total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom
recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery
from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred recovery. Any defendant
who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
§ 7102(a) and (b). For discussion of this statute see infra note 78.
68. Congini, 470 A.2d at 518-19.
69. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512.
70. 586A.2d 1017 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
71. Id. at 1019-20.
72. Id. at 1018.
73. Id. at 1019.
74. Id. at 1020.




and had disallowed the defense of contributory negligence to licensees,
were decided prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in
Pennsylvania.7" The defense of contributory negligence completely
barred the plaintiff from recovery. Under the comparative negligence
defense, however, negligence and liability are apportioned according to
relative fault. Therefore, the comparative negligence defense is not a
complete bar to the plaintiffs recovery.79
Therefore, the court concluded that, rather than establishing absolute
liability, the Majors and Schelin decisions disallowed the contributory
negligence defense based on a desire to allow the plaintiff to recover.'
The implication from Matthews and Congini is that the adoption of
comparative negligence in Pennsylvania compels a different result, for
example, admission of evidence of the plaintiffs own negligence.8
III. The Inconsistency
The current situation is inconsistent. If a tavern violates section 4-
493(1) of the Liquor Code by serving a minor, it is deemed negligent per
se and is liable for injuries sustained by the minor or a third party
proximately caused by the minor's consumption.' The tavern may,
however, assert the comparative negligence of the minor and its liability
may be limited accordingly.' A tavern which violates section 4-493(1)
of the Liquor Code by serving a visibly intoxicated customer is also
deemed to be negligent per se and liable for injuries sustained by the
patron's intoxication.' Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania courts have not
78. Id. Comparative negligence was adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1976. Act of
July 9, 1976, No. 152, 1976 Pa. Laws 855 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1993). For text of section 7102 see supra note 67. This is a departure from
the previous law of contributory negligence which served as a complete bar to a plaintiff's claim.
If a defendant could assert the negligence of the plaintiff, no matter how slight or minor in relation
to the defendant's negligence in bringing about the resulting injury, the plaintiff would be unable to
recover at all. The harshness of this rule precipitated the adoption by most jurisdictions of
comparative negligence in varying degrees. For a complete discussion of contributory/comparative
negligence see Keeton, supra note 13, § 65, at 461.
Pennsylvania's comparative negligence law allows a plaintiff to recover as long as their
negligence is not greater than the defendant(s). The defendant(s) are only liable for that percentage
of the damages which they were negligent as to the plaintiff and other defendants. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
79. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
80. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1020.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text. Liability here is also found under the
Crimes Code. See supra note 51. The violation is found to be negligence per se.
83. See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
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allowed licensees to assert the defense of comparative negligence when
their negligence per se is the service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated
patron."
This inconsistency is inappropriate; licensees should be permitted to
assert the defense of comparative negligence regardless of the status of
the individual to whom intoxicating beverages are served. This change
must take place for reasons of judicial integrity and social policy. This
change is logical because comparative negligence is not a complete bar
to plaintiffs claim and because it is questionable whether section 4-
493(1) should be considered an exceptional statute.
A. Judicial Integrity
Judicial integrity is a very important concept in Pennsylvania
law.86 This doctrine requires that courts be predictable and that when
confronted with the same fact scenarios, all courts will reach the same
outcome.87 Courts should not apply the same law differently.
In dram shop suits, violations of "exceptional statutes," which are
enacted to protect special classes of individuals,"8 are accorded
dissimilar treatment. The courts have determined that when a licensee
violates the laws of Pennsylvania by serving a minor or a visibly
intoxicated customer, he or she is negligent per se.89 The courts have
further determined that these prohibitions were enacted by the General
Assembly to protect the intoxicated patron or the minor and the public
at large.' In Majors and Schelin the courts impliedly determined that
these provisions met the Restatement's definition of "exceptional statute"
and therefore did not allow the defendants to invoke the defense of
85. As noted earlier, the court in Neal v. Sunset Grove Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 294 (1988),
confronted the issue of whether or not to allow the defense of contributory negligence to a tavern
which had served a visibly intoxicated adult. The case came after the adoption of comparative
negligence. The Neal court held that Majors and Schelin controlled and therefore did not allow the
tavern to assert this defense. Id. at 296-97.
86. This can be seen through Pennsylvania cases upholding the doctrine of stare decisis. See
Monongahela Street Ry. v. Philadelphia Co., 39 A.2d 909, 915-16 (Pa. 1944), and cases cited
therein.
87. See Yudacufski v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Transp., 454 A.2d 923, 926-27 (Pa.
1982).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965).
89. See supra notes 7-24, 38-64 and accompanying text. Negligence per se for the service of
alcohol to visibly intoxicated adults is found solely on the violation of section 4-493(1) of the Liquor
Code. Negligence per se for the service of alcohol to minors is found both through the Liquor Code
and the Crimes Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 306 and 6308.
90. See Majors, 205 A.2d at 875-76; Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511.
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contributory negligence. 9' However, in Matthews and Barrie the courts
did not apply the "exceptional statute" exception and allowed the
licensees to assert the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.'
This outcome is inconsistent and the different application of the same law
violates judicial integrity. This inconsistency must be remedied. The
Pennsylvania courts should adopt comparative negligence as a defense
available to licensees when sued by a patron or third party injured as a
result of the licensee serving the patron while he or she was visibly
intoxicated.
B. Public Policy
Public policy also dictates that licensees should be permitted to
assert the defense of comparative negligence. It is in society's best
interest that persons be held responsible for their own actions. 9 People
who drink to the point of intoxication should not be absolved completely
from the consequences of their actions. Moreover, such individuals
certainly should not be able to have their injuries completely
compensated. The failure to hold people responsible for their own
actions when such actions cause injuries to themselves or others
effectively condones the activity.
Pennsylvania courts have previously recognized the importance of
this social policy. In Orner V. Mallick the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court acknowledged its departure from the "great weight of authority in
the United States" which it had previously followed' regarding social
host liability.' The Orner court stated that under Congini this
abandonment of prior law was proper for minors.' The court
recognized that the legislature was seeking to protect minors from their
91. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. Lower courts have followed and not
permitted defendants to assert the defense of comparative negligence. See Neal v. Sunset Grove
Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 294 (1988).
92. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
93. Some may argue that in the case of innocent third parties, it is unfair to apportion damages
where the defendant who was intoxicated is insolvent and the defendant tavern has the "deep
pocket." Under Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute, however, a plaintiff will still be fully
compensated in this case. The statute specifically states that in the situation of joint defendants, a
plaintiff may recover his or her full damages from any one defendant and that defendant must seek
contribution from the other(s). 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (1982). For text see supra
note 67.
94. 527 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1987).
95. See Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to hold social host liable for
injuries resulting from intoxication of guests).
96. Id. at 523.
97. Id.
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own indiscretion.9" Still, the court concluded, the reasoning under the
common law which did not find liability for social hosts' furnishing
liquor to guests was sound. The court stated that:
The consequences of accepting intoxicants were left to the personal
responsibility of the guest, and the host was not required to answer
for their effect. The adult ...who drank more than he should
answered alone to himself and to all others for whatever injury
followed his acceptance of intoxicants. 9
Although licensees are governed by the Liquor Code, individuals must
be held responsible for their own conduct.
Other jurisdictions have also cited personal responsibility as a reason
for allowing the defense of comparative negligence. In Del E. Webb
Corp. v. Superior Court of Arizona"' the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that society's interest in holding one personally responsible for
drinking to the point of intoxication was one reason for allowing
defendant taverns the defense of comparative negligence.'' The court
cites Congini as support for this proposition, stating that it is in the best
interest of the public that most people be held responsible for their
conduct. 1" The court further limits its holding to the service of
alcohol to intoxicated adults. 3
In Lee v. Kiku Restaurant"' the Supreme Court of New Jersey
further espoused personal responsibility as a reason to allow a defendant
the defense of comparative negligence. The court stated that in allowing
taverns the defense of comparative negligence it was "strongly
influenced" by the public interest in deterring those who would create a
risk to others by voluntarily drinking to the point of intoxication.
15
The court recounted that the laws of New Jersey show that those who




100. 726 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane).
101. Id. at 586.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court did not reach the issue of whether the comparative negligence defense would
be applicable to cases where a minor is served. Id. n.8.
104. 603 A.2d 503 (N.J. 1992).
105. Id. at 509.
106. Id. The court cited to its statutes and cases regarding New Jersey's drunk driving laws.
Id.
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This "personal responsibility" rationale was also applied by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Lyons v. Nasby.l° The court stated that
one who voluntarily drinks to the point of intoxication should at least be
partially responsible for their injuries." 8 The court went on to state
that to prevent a tavern from demonstrating comparative negliegnce on
the part of the plaintiff would be a departure from traditional tort
principles."° Many jurisdictions, therefore, have accepted the public
policy rationale of holding one responsible for one's own actions in
justifying the application of the comparative negligence defense.
IV. The Logical Justifications for Permitting the Use of Comparative
Negligence in Dram Shop Suits
A. The Comparative/Contributory Distinction
One argument in favor of allowing the use of the comparative
negligence defense by licensees sued under a theory of negligence per se
is based upon the distinction between contributory negligence and
comparative negligence."0 Such a distinction has been espoused by the
Pennsylvania courts in decisions which permit a licensee to assert the
defense of comparative negligence when a minor was served and
consequently injured himself or herself or a third party."' It would be
consistent for the courts to apply this reasoning in cases involving the
service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated customer." 2
In Matthews, the court did not specifically address why the defense
of comparative negligence would be available to the licensee. The court
simply cited Congini and stated that a commercial licensee's liability to
a third party for damages proximately caused by the service of alcohol
was not absolute or irrebuttable."' Therefore, the court permitted the
licensee to assert the comparative negligence of the actor(s)
involved. " 4
107. 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
108. Id. at 1255.
109. Id. at 1259.
110. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's change to comparative negligence and the text of its
comparative negligence statute see supra notes 67, 78.
111. See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
112. In Neal, see supra notes 34-36, the court of common pleas did not follow the reasoning
applied in Matthews and Barrie (see supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text) despite the fact that
it was decided after the passage of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania.
113. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512.
114. Id.
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When the common pleas court in Barrie confronted the issue of
comparative negligence," 5 it drew an inference from Matthews. l l6
In Barrie the defendant attempted to assert the comparative negligence
of the plaintiff (a minor) who died after drinking with a minor to whom
the defendant had sold alcohol." 7  The court stated that although not
addressed specifically in Matthews or Congini, it is implied that the
enactment of comparative negligence compelled a different result than
that found in Majors and Schelin."18 The court further reasoned that
the Majors and Schelin decisions, which barred the contributory
negligence defense, were based primarily, if not solely, on the fact that
permitting the defense would act as a complete bar to the action." 9 In
such a case, the court reasoned, the duty imposed by section 4-493(1) of
the Liquor Code would become illusory. 20  Because comparative
negligence does not act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's claim, complete
loss of a claim is no longer a problem and the court concluded that a
different result was needed.'
2 '
In affirming the court of common pleas' decision in Barrie, the
commonwealth court agreed." The court labeled Matthews and
Congini as cases decided under the comparative negligence law while
Majors and Schelin were decided under the old contributory negligence
theory." This distinction was paramount to the decision of the later
courts in allowing licensees (and social hosts) the defense of comparative
negligence. 24 The court concluded that the adoption of comparative
negligence had changed the law regarding the availability of this defense
to licensees where civil liability is alleged through the violation of the
liquor laws."
115. Barrie v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 5 D. & C.4th 174 (1990), aft'd, 586 A.2d
1017 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. at 174-75, 178.
118. Id. at 181.
119. Id.
120. Barrie, 5 D. & C.4th at 181.
121. Id.
122. Barrie v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 586 A.2d 1017 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
123. Id. at 1020.
124. Id. (citing Matthews v. Konieczny, 527 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1987) and Congini v. Portersville
Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983)).
125. Id. The court also stated that earlier decisions did not actually hold the licensee strictly
liable. Id. The courts were really just drawing the inference that the illegal service was a
substantial cause of the injury because it would be an impossible burden for the plaintiff to meet if
he or she had to prove which drink served to the intoxicated individual caused the harm. Id.
It logically follows that the court should apply these same conclusions if confronted with a
case in which the violation by the licensee was serving a visibly intoxicated customer. It is likely
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Several jurisdictions which had held previously that the defense of
contributory negligence was unavailable to servers of alcohol have
allowed the defense of comparative negligence. 21 The adoption of
comparative negligence by the state controlled this result. The rationale
is that comparative negligence is not a complete bar to the plaintiff's
claim and therefore does not nullify the liability of the server for their
negligence. For example, California changed its law regarding allowable
defenses in Sagadin v. Ripper.27 The Sagadin court concluded that
because of the adoption of comparative negligence, providers of alcohol
should be permitted to assert the negligence of the plaintiff as a
defense."2  The court reasoned that defendants who have violated a
statute intended to protect the plaintiff against his or her own negligence
would not be completely absolved from liability under comparative
negligence. 29 The servers of alcohol, the court concluded, were
entitled to have the plaintiff's negligence apportioned under the principals
of comparative negligence. '30
Minnesota also began permitting commercial and social providers
of alcohol to use the defense of comparative negligence even though it
had not allowed the same defendants the defense of contributory
negligence. The civil liability provision of Minnesota's dram shop
statute is governed by the comparative negligence statute.' 3' In
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when afforded the appropriate opportunity, will follow its
decisions in Mathews and Congini and allow a tavern to assert the comparative negligence of an
adult patron who was served while visibly intoxicated.
126. Not all jurisdictions discontinued the exceptional statute exception to contributory
negligence with the adoption of comparative negligence. See, e.g., Loeb v. Rasmussen, 822 P.2d
914, 917-19 (Alaska 1991) (court reverses jury's apportionment of damages stating that Alaska's
codifying comparative negligence did not change the exceptional statute exception and therefore the
court was unwilling to consider a minor's contributory negligence); Slager v. HWA Corp., 435
N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Iowa 1989) (Supreme Court of Iowa affirms lower court's decision that
defense of comparative fault does not apply in dram shop cases. The statute is intended to protect
innocent citizens and if the legislature wanted comparative negligence to apply to dram shop cases,
it could have stated so explicitly when adopting comparative negligence.)
127. 221 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (social host was found liable for injuries sustained
as a result of serving a minor in violation of a statute).
128. Id. at 691-92.
129. Id. at 677-78, 687-93. The court waffled on whether or not the statute prohibiting the
provision of alcohol to minors constituted an exceptional statute (one intended to protect the plaintiff
from his own negligence). See supra note 25. Even if this statute falls into the category of
exceptional statutes, the court concluded, the adoption of comparative negligence ended the need for
the "special class exception" which does not allow the defendant the contributory negligence defense
due to its complete bar on plaintiffs claim. Id. at 690-93. The court then added that plaintiffs
contributory fault was always to be apportioned even in the case of exceptional statutes unless the
legislature expressly states otherwise. Id. at 692-93.
130. Id. at 693-94.
131. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West 1990).
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Danielson v. Johnson' the court of appeals of Minnesota affirmed the
jury's allocation of fault based on the percentage of each party's
negligence. 33  The court stated that it was proper to give to the jury
the question of contributory negligence. 3"
New Jersey also began allowing taverns the defense of comparative
negligence only after it had preempted its predecessor, contributory
negligence. In Lee v. Kiku Restaurant35 the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's verdict
because the jury had not been instructed on comparative negligence.
36
In so doing, the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically expanded on
an earlier decision allowing a limited comparative negligence defense'
37
and overturned an even earlier holding 38 which had prohibited the
defendant from asserting the plaintiffs negligence as a defense. 139 This
previous holding, the court reasoned, was adopted when contributory
negligence was a complete bar to a plaintiffs recovery. The court
concluded that it was now appropriate to allow the defendant to assert the
comparative negligence defense since a plaintiff may recover even when
he or she is also negligent."
B. The "Exceptional Statute" Finding
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that dram shop statutes do
not meet the criteria of an "exceptional statute."' 41  Therefore, the
"exceptional statute" exception which does not allow defendants to assert
the defense of contributory negligence should not be a factor in dram
shop suits. This is especially true in relation to intoxicated patrons. 42
132. 366 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
133. Id. at 313-14.
134. Id. at 313.
135. 603A.2d 503 (N.J. 1992).
136. Id. at 511.
137. Buckley v. Estate of Pirolo, 500 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1985). Buckley held that a tavern could
reduce its liability upon demonstrating that the plaintiff had the capacity to appreciate the risk of
engaging in the activity which led to the plaintiff's injuries. Lee, 603 A.2d at 507. The tavern
could not, however, assert the defense of comparative negligence where it had served a visibly
intoxicated patron and as a result of his intoxicated state the patron could not take self-protective
measures. Id.
138. Soronenv. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 218 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1966) (superseded by statute as
stated in Tose v. Greater Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993)).
139. Lee, 603 A.2d at 509-11.
140. Id.
141. For discussion on "exceptional statutes" see supra note 30.
142. Some jurisdictions with dram shop acts which hold taverns strictly liable do not allow an
action by a patron who drinks to the point of intoxication and becomes injured. See, e.g., Weeks
v. Princeton's, 570 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Ala. 1990); Jodelis v. Harris, 517 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Ill.
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Arizona disposed of the "exceptional statute" argument in dram
shop cases in Del E. Webb Corp. v. Superior Court of Arizona."" The
Webb court allowed the defendant to raise the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk.'" The court refused to term the
state's dram shop statute "exceptional." 45 The court refused to give
"exceptional statute" status to the statute because no clear legislative
intent to bar these defenses existed. The court concluded that courts
should not bar these defenses absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary.'4
The court gave four additional reasons why they would not term
their dram shop statute "exceptional." First, a statute prohibiting the
sale of alcohol to intoxicated patrons and minors appears to be primarily
intended to protect the general public. 147  Second, it is not in the
public's best interest to impose absolute liability where no liability
previously existed for selling liquor to "an able bodied person."' 48
Third, the adoption of comparative negligence now prohibits the action
from becoming barred so there can be no imposition of absolute liability
anyway. 49 Fourth, it is good judicial policy to preserve defenses in
dram shop actions." ° The court here cites Congini and states that the
interests of the public are best served by the common law principals that
make most people responsible for their own conduct. 5'
V. Conclusion
Under Pennsylvania dram shop law a licensee can be held liable for
injuries caused by violation of section 4-493(1) of the Liquor Code. 52
This liability is termed absolute. 5 3  Therefore, a plaintiff is only
required to prove that the licensee violated section 4-493(1) and that this
violation caused the plaintiff's damages.
There is an inconsistency in this dram shop law regarding available
defenses. When a licensee's violation consists of serving a visibly
intoxicated customer, the licensee is not permitted to assert the
1987); Ciemierek v. Jim's Garage, 282 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
143. 726 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1986).
144. See id. at 587.
145. Id. at 583-84.
146. Id. at 584.
147. Id. at 585.
148. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 726 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1986).
149. Id. at 586.
150. Id.
151. Id. These are all reasons Pennsylvania courts should consider.
152. See supra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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comparative negligence defense." However, when the tavern's
violation is serving a minor, the licensee is permitted to assert the
defense of comparative negligence.'
This inconsistency is untenable. First, it violates judicial
integrity. 5 6  Pennsylvania should follow its own precedent regarding
the defense of comparative negligence in cases in which the tavern served
a minor. The same reasons for allowing taverns the comparative
negligence defense when they have served a minor mandate a change in
the law regarding cases in which a tavern served a visibly intoxicated
customer. Second, it is in society's interest for people to be responsible
for their own actions." 7 When patrons drink themselves to the point
of intoxication, they should not be absolved from liability for their acts
which injure others.
Third, the Pennsylvania courts gave the distinction between
contributory negligence and comparative negligence as a reason for
allowing taverns to assert the defense of comparative negligence. 58
Contributory negligence had completely barred a plaintiff from recovery.
Comparative negligence merely limits recovery according to relevant
fault. 1 9  Therefore, a different result is compelled now that
comparative negligence has been adopted by the legislature. It is
important to note that other jurisdictions began allowing taverns to assert
the comparative negligence of the minor or a visibly intoxicated customer
after the state changed from contributory negligence to comparative
negligence.160
Finally, it is questionable whether or not section 4-493(1) is an
"exceptional statute." An "exceptional statute" is one which is intended
to protect a certain class of persons from themselves. 6 ' Pennsylvania
termed section 4-493(1) of the Liquor Code an "exceptional statute." 62
The courts found that the legislature intended the statute to protect visibly
intoxicated patrons and minors from themselves.63 As other
jurisdictions have found, it seems more likely that dram shop acts were
154. See supra notes 7-37 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 38-81 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 86, 87 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 110-140 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 126-140 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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intended to protect society from the intoxicated individual.'" It also
seems more likely that the legislature would have intended to protect the
minor from his or her own impropriety than the adult from his or her
own impropriety.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet confronted the issue
of the availability of the comparative negligence defense in dram shop
suits where the tavern violated the Liquor Code by serving a visibly
intoxicated customer. 65 It may be that when the appropriate case does
come before the Supreme Court, or the Superior Court, the defense will
be allowed." The Pennsylvania courts should follow their own
decisions in cases where a tavern has served a minor. The courts of
Pennsylvania should allow taverns to assert the comparative negligence
defense in all suits brought under section 4-493(1) of the Liquor Code.
Leonard H. MacPhee
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
165. The Supreme Court cases which did not allow contributory negligence were decided prior
to the adoption of comparative negligence. See, e.g., Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 873 (Pa.
1965). Neal v. Sunset Grove Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 294 (1988) was decided after the adoption of
comparative negligence but was heard in the court of common pleas.
166. The appropriate case would require the right fact scenario and a defendant willing to appeal
a lower court's order not allowing the defendant to assert the defense of comparative negligence.

